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Restrictions, Mandates, and the Arizona Budget
Arizona is emerging from one of the worst state budget crises in the nation. Entering
2003, its projected deficit, measured as a percentage of the general fund, was the fifth
largest in the country.1 The state had slashed spending in 2002 in the face of a $900
million deficit, but still faced a $400 million shortfall for fiscal year 2003 and an
estimated $1 billion deficit in fiscal 2004. Although improved revenues have reduced
the anticipated gap, fundamental underlying problems remain concerning the ability of
lawmakers to control the budget. Some observers consider this a revenue problem,
others a spending problem. Our concern in this paper is whether state lawmakers have
enough control over either revenue or spending.
Arizona officials concerned with budgeting must live with a variety of financial
restrictions. Some are of the “thou shall not” type in regard to borrowing, spending, and
revenue raising; others are of the “thou shall” type, requiring spending on particular
programs or services. Some, such as the limit on general obligation bond borrowing,
stem from long-standing provisions in Arizona’s constitution. Others originated in recent
voter-approved measures that require greater spending in certain areas or make it more
difficult for the legislature to raise revenues. In addition,
recent federal mandates and court decisions have further
restricted Arizona lawmakers’ discretion by requiring
spending in the areas of health care and school
construction. The bottom line, many feel, is that budget
makers, especially legislators, have lost considerable
power to raise revenues, control the level of spending, and
set spending priorities. These serious developments could
radically affect Arizona’s future, but their complexity and
the complicated connections between the budgets and
mandates make them a tough topic for public debate.
Disputes over financial restrictions and mandates reflect conflicts between people with
differing philosophical views concerning the role of government, between direct and
representative democracy, among branches of government and among levels of
government — battles that all have deep roots in the politics of the state. Broadly, the
debate has been: Who should decide? The debate also raises the question of how
financial decisions should be made, in particular whether budgeting can be a
comprehensive process where everything is “on the table,” subject to the same
budgetary mechanism, and participants can measure the value of one alternative
against another.
Of particular concern to many observers is the growing role of voters in financial matters.
The development is particularly salient in Arizona, because the 1998 Voter Protection
Act made voters’ decisions on initiative or referendum measures almost impossible for
the legislature to alter, no matter how much the measures affect revenues. Voters
Arizona officials concerned with
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adopted the act as Proposition 105, following the legislature’s reversal of a previous
voter-approved measure reducing the penalty for drug use. The Voter Protection Act
requires a three-fourths vote in both legislative chambers to make any changes in
measures adopted by the voters, no matter what they wind up costing. Moreover, any
change must “further the purpose” of the original ballot proposition. All propositions
passed in and after 1998 enjoy this protection. Given these barriers, those seeking to
change measures adopted by the voters have little alternative but to challenge them in
court or to ask voters to reverse or modify their previous decisions.
In this paper we identify the existing types of financial limitations on lawmakers,
evaluate their intended and unintended effects, draw comparisons to other states, and
explore possible courses of remedial action. We first look at restrictions on debt,
spending, and taxing, then at spending mandates. Third, we consider the impact of
these on the making of the state general fund budget, which is comprised of revenues
from sales, income, and other taxes. Finally, though our main concern is with state
government, we note problems at the local level.
Limitations on Debt, Spending, and Taxing
State constitutions and statutes place various types of restrictions on state and local
debt, spending, and taxing. Many of these limitations date from the beginning of the
twentieth century. Others were prompted by the taxpayers’ rebellion sparked in 1978 by
voter approval of Proposition 13 in California, a measure that limited property taxation.
Proposition 13 led to demands for taxing and spending limits throughout the country.
Debt
When it comes to borrowing, state constitutions and laws impose two general types of
restrictions: maximum limits on the amount of debt, and requirements that public
referenda be held to permit the issuance of bonds. Debt limits most often apply to
borrowing through general obligation bonds, which are paid for out of general revenues
backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing government. Limits are often expressed
as a percentage (from 15 to 25%) of the value of the property within the jurisdiction, but
may also be stated in specific dollar amounts.
Arizona has an unusually low debt limit. Under Article 9, Section 5 of the state
constitution, the state may borrow more than $350,000 only “to repel invasion,
suppress insurrection, or defend the state in time of war.” This restriction goes back to
the original 1910 constitution 7and applies by court rulings only to general obligation
bonds; its effect has been to encourage the state to turn to revenue bonds, which are
secured by a specific revenue source such as that generated by a project for which
money is borrowed. Revenue bonds usually cost the government more in interest
because investors see them as more of a risk than general obligation bonds. Arizona law
does not limit the amount the state can raise by revenue bonds, but does require public
approval of them. Currently, the state has a debt of some $5 billion. Debt payments now
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take $71 million out of the general fund, and thus reduce the use of the fund for other
purposes. Much of the debt involves long-term financing for items such as school, road,
and prison construction. Although the dollar numbers may appear impressive, the latest
rankings by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (FY2000) place Arizona 49th out of the 50
states in per capita debt outstanding.
Arizona officials, like those in other states, get around both the debt limit and the need
for voter approval by issuing certificates of participation (COPs) and entering into
complicated lease-purchase agreements. The government leases what it wants — for
example, a new building — from a private firm or other third party, then takes title to the
building at the end of the lease. Alternately, the state might sell a building to a third
party, then put the money in the general fund and lease back the property. In both
cases, the lease payments are not considered as debt, but as operating expenses paid
for out of annual appropriations. However, as they accumulate, such payments could
have a considerable impact on the general fund. While COPs offer flexibility, they are
usually more expensive to issue than bonds because of the involvement of third parties.
Spending
A restriction added to the Arizona constitution in 1978 — in response to the taxpayers’
rebellion — confines state spending to no more than 7 percent of residents’ gross
personal income.2 This percentage may be adjusted to reflect developments such as
increased expenditures due to federal mandates or state assumption of local functions.
Currently, it stands at 7.41 percent. Spending has thus far never exceeded the limit — as
a percent of income it amounted to 5.6 percent in 2004.3
Insofar as legislative discretion is concerned, the situation could be far worse. Colorado,
for example, limits state government spending to changes in inflation plus population.
Colorado’s Taxpayers Bill of Rights (TABOR), approved by voters in 1992, also requires
that voters approve any new state tax or increase in an existing tax, and that revenues
over the amount the state can spend be refunded to taxpayers unless the voters decide
otherwise. The law imposes similar restrictions on local governments, limiting local
spending to changes in population and property values.
Taxing
A far more effective constraint on the ability of Arizona legislators to adjust to changing
needs than the spending limit is Proposition 108, a constitutional amendment adopted
by the voters in 1992. This requires a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the
House and Senate to increase any tax or revenue source or to make any “net increase”
in the state’s revenue collection — a requirement that, in effect, makes even the
smallest increase very unlikely. Previously, changes of this nature required only a
majority vote. This measure has made it much more difficult to raise taxes than to cut
them — the latter still requiring only a simple majority. Whether the two-thirds
requirement applies to the elimination of tax exemptions — the state has been losing
$4.2 billion a year in sales tax exemptions alone — awaits legal clarification.
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Because of the law, the best alternative for those seeking to increase revenues is to take
their case directly to the voters. In recent years several groups have done so, asking
voters to approve new or increased taxes for particular programs. Legislators, in part
because of Proposition 108, have also passed tax decisions on to the voters. It is much
easier to secure the legislative votes to put a measure on the ballot — only a majority is
required — than it is to round up enough supporters to increase taxes. Indeed,
Proposition 108 might be expected to lead to more and more basic tax decisions being
made by the voters.
Most states still require a simple majority in the legislature to increase revenues.4
Arizona is one of 11 states that require a supermajority vote; some of the other 10
impose a three-fourths requirement and some posit three-fifths. Critics charge that
supermajority requirements make it difficult for the
legislature to respond to emergencies, encourage it to
shift costs to local governments — done by a simple
majority vote — and may even bring more wasteful state
spending.5 This last result occurs, critics say, because
supermajority requirements increase the difficulty of
building support for new or expanded taxes, and thus
increase the bargaining power of individual legislators.
Some lawmakers may be tempted to hold back their
support until they can exchange it for leadership support
of their own favored projects. There is some evidence of
this type of bargaining6 in California — a state with a two-
thirds vote requirement not only for tax increases but for the adoption of the budget and
related budget bills. In Arizona the most evident effect of the supermajority requirement
has been to take talk of tax hikes through direct legislative action off the table.
Spending Mandates from Voters, Courts, and the Federal Government
Spending mandates are legal requirements that state lawmakers spend money for
certain purposes and certain purposes alone. They take decision-making out of the
hands of lawmakers and hinder their ability to plan for or respond to financial
emergencies. Not all spending mandates, however, are the same. Some are self-
imposed by the legislature and can be changed by altering a statute or evaded through
budgetary techniques that divert the flow of existing funds. More difficult to control are
mandates imposed by voters (especially those protected by the Voter Protection Act),
court orders, and the federal government. Voter-approved measures, court decisions,
and federal requirements and mandates — particularly pronounced in recent years —
have required the state to fund programs and services often without providing the
revenues to do so.
Most states still require a simple
majority in the legislature to
increase revenues. Arizona is one
of 11 states that require a
supermajority vote; some of the
other 10 impose a three-fourths
requirement and some posit
three-fifths.
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Voters
In recent years, voters have bypassed the legislative process by approving several ballot
measures that create a new tax or increase an old one and dedicate the revenues to
particular programs. Voters have also approved proposals that require the legislature to
pay for new or expanded programs out of general revenues, thereby leaving less money
for other programs. Some measures reached the ballot through the efforts of private
groups such as health organizations that used the initiative route to take their case to
the voters. Often, though, the legislature itself has asked voters to tie its hands by
submitting referendums that earmark funds beyond legislative control or commit the
legislature to spend large amounts of money out of general revenues.
In 1994, for example, a coalition of health organizations persuaded Arizona voters to
raise tobacco taxes and dedicate the proceeds to a variety of health care programs,
beyond the reach of the legislature. Later, however, the coalition became unhappy over
the legislature’s raiding of the tobacco fund for purposes other than those for which it
was intended. The group contemplated asking voters to approve a similar but expanded
plan that, because of the Voter Protection Act, would be out of the reach of the
legislature. Lawmakers headed this off by developing a proposal acceptable to the group
and submitting it to the voters in a referendum. Voters went along with the second tax
hike on tobacco in 2002, the proceeds of which are earmarked for particular programs.
On the plus side, the shifting of support for some existing programs to tobacco taxes
saved the general fund budget an estimated $63 million in the first year alone. On the
minus side, the programs slipped out of the control of the legislature. Voters in 2002
also supported an Indian gaming measure that several tribes had negotiated with
Governor Jane Hull, but which the governor could not get through the legislature. Taking
the initiative route, the tribes won voter approval of a new gaming compact under which
tribes will share 8 percent of their gaming revenues with the state. These funds are
earmarked for a variety of specific purposes, such as reducing school class sizes, wildlife
conservation, and health care. This is expected to generate $54 million for fiscal 2004
and over $80 million for fiscal 2005.
The two voter-approved measures that have thus far made the largest impact on the
general fund were adopted in 2000, making them tamper-proof by the legislature. One
was Proposition 204, which expanded eligibility for benefits from the Arizona Health Care
Cost Containment System (AHCCCS, the state’s Medicaid alternative) to all residents at
or below the poverty level; eligibility had previously extended up to about 35 percent of
the poverty level. The proposition added thousands more Arizonans to the program and
increased costs by hundreds of thousands, but provided only some $80 million per year
from the state’s share of the nationwide tobacco lawsuit settlement. This, as it turned
out, was not enough. The legislature in 2003 was left with the problem of finding
additional millions in the general fund to finance the program’s growth. The second
measure, Proposition 301, increased the sales tax to 5.6 percent from 5 percent for 20
years to fund the public education system and earmarked the funds so that they were
not subject to legislative appropriation. Proposition 301 was developed by Governor Hull
and put on the ballot by the legislature after it was unable to come up with the two-thirds
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vote required by Proposition 108. The measure created a dedicated revenue stream of
some $440 million in new funds, much of it for teacher pay raises. The measure also
required the legislature to increase the base level of state aid to K-12 education by
$94.5 million in 2002 and to adjust it annually by 2 percent or the inflation rate,
whichever was less. These expenses were to come out of general revenues.
Courts
Both state and federal courts have deeply impacted state budget-making around the
country. State courts in general have become more active since the 1980s in reviewing
the decisions of elected officials and administrators. One reason for this is that the U.S.
Supreme Court has encouraged the resolution of issues in
state courts under state law. In addition, various groups
have found that litigation in state courts, while expensive,
is much less costly than intensive lobbying in the
legislature and administrative areas and is also likely to
be more successful. As a result, state courts have become
more actively involved in making general policies
governing the operation of schools, prisons, and other
public institutions. With this increased activity, they have
antagonized more groups and have often provoked
negative reactions.
The Arizona Supreme Court historically has not been among the most active courts when
it comes to finding state laws in violation of the state constitution or in expanding state
constitutional rights.7 But it has made some important decisions that have forced
changes in the state’s spending priorities. A prominent example occurred in 1994 when
the state Supreme Court ruled, in response to a 1991 suit by the Arizona Center for Law
in the Public Interest, that the legislature must reduce gross disparities among school
districts concerning the conditions of school buildings, equipment, and other capital
needs.8 The court, in a 3-2 decision, found that such disparities violated the state
constitutional requirement for a general and uniform public school system. The court
ordered the legislature to fix the system “within a reasonable time.” Over the next 4
years, the court rejected several legislative proposals to remedy the problem until, in
1998, it threatened to end all public school financing unless the legislature corrected
the inequities.
In that same year, the legislature came up with acceptable legislation, called “Students
First,” which assigned the state most of the responsibility for school construction and
maintenance — moving the expense of some $2 billion from local property taxes to the
state. To pay for it, the legislature used revenue bonds, lease-purchase schemes, and
general revenues, the latter mostly to pay off the debt. Since then, however, an almost
continuous stream of litigation has claimed that the program’s building-renewal fund,
which provides school districts money to make repairs, has not been properly funded
and has been illegally raided by the legislature to cover budget deficits. The legislature
used $69 million from the Student’s First building-renewal fund to help balance the
Both state and federal courts have
deeply impacted state budget-
making around the country. State
courts in general have become
more active since the 1980s in
reviewing the decisions of elected
officials and administrators.
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fiscal 2002 budget, and, despite a court ruling to the contrary, $90 million to balance
the 2003 budget. For fiscal 2004, it decided to temporarily stop putting money into the
fund.
The Arizona courts’ struggle with the legislature over Students First was nothing
compared to their decades-long effort to compel the legislature to live up to its
agreement to improve funding for mental health services. The principal case, Arnold v.
Sarn,9 was begun in 1981 and was resolved as far as the legal issues were concerned in
1989. But only in recent years have any funds been forthcoming.
The courts have also produced results in regard to class action tax litigation. In 2001,
the state Supreme Court made it easier for taxpayers to band together and file class
action lawsuits challenging tax laws and decisions; the court did so by ruling that
plaintiffs do not have to first individually exhaust available administrative remedies.10 In
2002, the state lost a class-action lawsuit regarding the taxation of dividends from out-
of-state corporations11; in 2004 it must begin refunding $350 million in taxes. Governor
Janet Napolitano has sought, thus far without success in the legislature, to prohibit or at
least slow down such suits. Also pending is a suit by 140,000 public employees who
claim they were illegally taxed by the state.
In passing, one should note that Arizona has recently had some difficulty with federal as
well state courts. A costly example was the 2000 Flores v. Arizona decision by a federal
district judge, who ruled that the state’s underfunding of language-acquisition programs
in Arizona public schools violated the federal Equal Education Opportunities Act.12 In
fiscal year 2003, the state spent $44 million to comply with the decision.
Federal Government
In the mid-1970s, the federal government, faced with budgetary problems of its own,
began using regulatory mandates rather than subsidies to encourage states and
localities to take various courses of action. These laws compel state and local
governments to comply with certain policies — and thus often to absorb various costs —
under the threat of civil and criminal penalties. Costly federal mandates have been
enacted in areas such as air and water quality, solid waste, hazardous waste,
transportation standards, labor management, health care, courts, and corrections.
Specific examples of congressional legislation creating unfunded mandates are the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and National Voter Registration
Act. Mandating allows federal officials both to claim credit for acting on a variety of
issues and, by shifting much of the costs onto state and local governments, to reduce
pressures on the federal budget. As a National Governors Association official put it: “The
idea is that they get the credit, we get the bills.”13 Faced with growing discontent among
local officials, Congress in 1995 passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, which was
intended to make federal mandating more difficult. Although the act appears to have
focused greater congressional attention on the issue, state and local officials continue to
complain about expensive federal directives.
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Researchers also commonly categorize expenses associated with federal grants, such as
state matching requirements, as mandated spending. One can argue that this is an
inaccurate designation, because states are not forced to take federal aid and, therefore,
come up with matching grants. In practical terms, however, states have found it difficult
to turn away federal funds. And once tied into a federal program, they find it difficult both
politically and financially to give it up. But being linked in this manner means that state
budgets are significantly impacted by not only requirements for matching funds but also
by federal changes in service level requirements; state lawmakers also often feel
compelled to fill in for cuts in federal spending. Arizona is perhaps most importantly tied
into federal policy making through the joint federal-state Medicaid program, which
provides health coverage to the poor. Federal funds make up about two-thirds of the
$3.5 billion AHCCCS budget. The state spends over $600 million each year on the
program out of general funds, mostly in matching grants.
State and local governments are subject to regulations and controls that come as a
condition of accepting federal aid. All grants, for example, are subject to certain
crosscutting requirements, such as one that bars the use of federal funds to support
programs that discriminate against racial minorities. In other situations, state and local
governments have been subject to crossover sanctions. These can curtail federal aid to
state and local governments unless they adopt policies that are related only indirectly, if
at all, to the aid program in question. Congress, for example, has threatened to withhold
federal highway funds unless states adopt a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit, raise the
drinking age to 21, and, most recently, modify DUI laws. Any costs involved have been
absorbed by the states.
One recent federal measure with an expensive impact on state budgets is the No Child
Left Behind law that took effect in January 2002. The statute was designed to improve
overall academic performance and to end chronic gaps in achievement among students
in different districts and between disadvantaged and more-advantaged students. It puts
considerable pressure on states to design and implement standardized testing
programs, and on local school systems to improve achievement across the board — or
face consequences ranging from having to pay for private tutoring to having the state
take over their schools. The program may well cost Arizona more than $100 million just
to comply with the testing requirements. Other costs include those for data collection,
developing higher teacher and curriculum standards, and upgrading tutoring and reading
programs. If Arizona chooses to ignore the law, however, it could lose over $300 million
annually in federal funds for financially needy students. In another example, Arizona
lawmakers have long complained about federal laws that require state and local
governments, particularly along the Mexican border, to pick up some or all of the costs of
health and educational services for both legal and illegal Mexican immigrants.
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Controlling the Budget
In Arizona as in most other states, most of the public’s attention concerning state
financial matters centers on legislative, gubernatorial, and agency activity in the making
of the general fund budget, which is based on revenues from sales, income, and other
taxes. But while this exercise features a balancing act that requires a great deal of fund
shifting and imaginative accounting — especially in times of economic stress — it directly
accounts for only a portion of what the state spends each year. Though legislators have
more influence over spending than is commonly assumed, much spending is mandatory.
The budgeting process, moreover, falls far short in terms of comprehensiveness or
thoroughness.
The Big Picture
In recent years, the general fund budget has accounted for less than half of what the
state spends annually. In FY 2003, for example, the general fund portion was 38
percent. The remainder consisted of: federal funds, the spending of which is largely
controlled by the governor and
agency heads, some 28 percent;
and funds built up from fees or
from earmarked taxes for
particular programs, 34 percent.
Examples of the latter include
the earmarking of motor fuel
and highway user taxes for
transportation purposes and, as
already noted, of tobacco taxes
for health programs. At last
count, there were 270 non-
appropriated special and
revolving accounts.
Approximately 60 percent of state spending takes place outside the general fund. Within
the general fund, moreover, another 60 percent is essentially non-discretionary, in that it
is automatically programmed to increase or decrease according to formulas in the laws
creating various programs.14 Much of the growth in the general fund budget in recent
years has come because of formulas calling for increased spending as the number of
school children increase or as more people go on AHCCCS. It is in these areas where
voter-approved spending measures — Propositions 204 and 301 and Students First —
have had their greatest impact in terms of both increasing expenditures and limiting
legislative discretion.
Overall, the picture appears dismal when it comes to legislative control of spending. In
fiscal year 2003, for example, Arizona had a total operating budget of $16.4 billion and
a general fund budget of $6.2 billion. But within the general fund budget, lawmakers
Arizona Total Operating Budget — FY 2003
Amount ($ billions) %
General Fund 6.2 38
Earmarked Fees and Taxes 5.6 34
Federal Funds 4.7 28
Total Budget 16.4* 100
General Funds — Non-Discretionary 3.9 24
General Funds — Discretionary 2.3 14
*Budget figures may not total $16.4 due to rounding.
Source: Joint Legislative Budget Committee.
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could be said to have had discretionary control of just $2.3 billion — or some 14 percent
of the overall total. On the other hand, the situation is not so dire in practice because the
legislature, by changing or suspending statutes, can tap into off-budget funds to balance
the general fund budget. It also can change the formulas driving general fund spending
— though not those approved by the voters in recent years.
The Process
In Arizona, as in all other states except Vermont, the general fund budget must be
balanced each year.15 The adoption of the budget requires a majority vote of the entire
membership — 31 house members and 16 senators. A
few other states invite stalemate and lengthier sessions
by imposing a greater hurdle — a three-fourths vote in
Arkansas and a two-thirds vote in California and Rhode
Island. In terms of decision-making, the Arizona budget
process, like that in Colorado, often takes the form of “a
succession of responses to revenue forecasts.”16
In Arizona, dueling revenue projections typically come from the governor and the
legislature. The size of the deficit, if any, is usually a matter of some dispute. When there
is consensus that revenues are likely to lag behind a desired level of expenditures, the
budget is “balanced” through a variety of moves: borrowing money, selling state property
(with or without lease-back provisions), making transfers into the general fund from
other state funds, shifting expenses to federal programs, and performing various sleight-
of-hand accounting moves such as counting revenues not yet received or postponing
payment of bills to the next fiscal year. An example of the latter is the education
“rollover,” through which the legislature postpones payments to schools from one fiscal
year to the next to make the budget appear balanced. Sometimes legislators have been
lucky: In 2003, for example, Arizona was able to create a budget for fiscal 2004 without
tax increases or major cuts with the aid of a one-time federal bailout of $308 million.
Even earmarked funds are not all that secure. In 2003, for example, the legislature
sliced the share of the state income tax earmarked for municipalities from 15 percent to
14.8 percent, and diverted some highway fund money going to localities into the general
fund. Still, when cuts must be made, attention is likely to be first drawn to the most
vulnerable of the programs supported by general revenues. In 2003, much of the money
controlled by the legislature went to the Department of Corrections. Cutting this budget,
however, was politically off limits. The number of prisoners had been steadily rising
because of population growth and because of get-tough measures adopted by the
legislature that increased both the number of people sent to prison and the length of
time served. But few lawmakers seemed willing to reduce costs through early release
programs that would put convicts, even those not considered dangerous, back on the
streets. In the end, the most vulnerable funds were those for the university system and
some non-protected spending for K-12 education and other social services.
In Arizona, as in all other states
except Vermont, the general fund
budget must be balanced each
year.
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Somehow, the budget gets balanced. But the process is far from ideal when it comes to
making a comprehensive evaluation of the state’s spending programs. Lawmakers
periodically express concern that so little of what Arizona spends is directly subject to
legislative review through the general fund appropriations process. Some have proposed
“Truth-In-Budgeting” acts that would bring federal dollars and various agency funds into
the appropriation process. Governors, who control many of the funds through their
agency directors, have successfully resisted such proposals. It has not been a partisan
issue. In 2003, Democratic Governor Napolitano vetoed such a measure passed by the
Republican legislature. In 1996, an earlier Republican legislature passed a similar act,
only to have it vetoed by Republican Governor Fife Symington.
Even legislators themselves have not been altogether willing to abandon the idea of
earmarking funds and keeping them out of the general fund appropriation process. In
part, this is because individual members are uneasy about what their colleagues might
do to particular earmarked programs if they had to compete for funding. In 1994, for
example, lawmakers resolved to bring several non-appropriated funds under legislative
control. The following year, however, they wound up agreeing that funds for several
favored programs — notably the Arizona Commission on the Arts — should stay
earmarked to ensure that they were not “zeroed out” and appropriated for other
purposes.
The Earmarking Problem
Arizona has been considerably above the national average for earmarking. State officials
have been earmarking about 31 percent of revenues in recent years, while the national
average for states has been about 22 percent.17 Much of the earmarking is self-imposed
by the legislature; lawmakers could change the statutes,
but are reluctant to do so because of pressure from
affected groups and because of their commitment to
particular programs.
Earmarking has value in providing a relatively secure and
stable source of funding for a program or activity. In the
case of motor fuel taxes, it reflects the idea that those
who benefit from how tax monies are used (highway
users) should pay the taxes. In a practical sense
earmarking is also useful in helping secure voter support
for new or increased taxes — taxes are more acceptable
when tied to a popular program or cause, such as education reform. On the negative
side, the practice gets in the way of comprehensive budgeting — where, ideally,
legislators weigh all funding proposals against each other — and makes it more difficult
for lawmakers to adapt to changing social and economic conditions. The lack of flexibility
may be particularly harmful in regard to the highway fund. Placing gasoline taxes in the
highway fund guarantees a certain level of support for road building and maintenance.
But the practice ties up a great deal of revenue and thus limits lawmakers’ ability to
respond to other pressing problems.
Arizona has been considerably
above the national average for
earmarking. State officials have
been earmarking about 31
percent of revenues in recent
years, while the national average
for states has been about 22
percent.
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Finally, by removing programs and services from the periodic review of the
appropriations process, earmarking slants state governmental activities in favor of
priorities that the legislature fails to reexamine or weigh against new concerns.
Conversely, programs not protected by the practice become more vulnerable to budget
cuts when conditions are tough.
The Situation for Local Governments
General purpose local governments — counties and municipalities (cities and towns) —
share many of the problems of the state government when it comes to limitations on
their ability to raise and spend funds, though an overall assessment of their impact on
local budgets has yet to be made. Many of the restrictions have to do with the property
tax which, in Arizona, is almost exclusively a local tax. In addition to restrictions on
borrowing, spending, and taxing, local budgeting is impacted by mandates coming not
only from the usual suspects — voters, courts, and the federal government — but from
the state government as well.
General Limitations
Constitutional provisions and state statutes impose controls on nearly all aspects of
local financial management: assessment, taxation, indebtedness, budgeting,
accounting, auditing, and fiscal reporting. State law also places various restrictions on
borrowing — limits are expressed as a percentage of the
assessed property value in a jurisdiction; localities cannot
exceed these limits without public approval. On the whole,
however, local governments are freer to borrow money
than the state, and in the aggregate do about three times
as much. As for spending, a 1980 amendment to the
Arizona constitution limits local government expenditures
to the levels that existed in FY1979, as adjusted annually
to reflect changes in population and the cost of living. The
law exempts certain expenditures, such as for bond
principal and interest payments. Spending in excess of the
limits must receive a two-thirds vote of the governing
body, as well as voter approval. In practice, this formula has had an adverse effect on
municipalities that have experienced rapid growth since 1980 and the accompanying
need for greatly increased infrastructure and other expenditures. However, cities and
towns can seek voter approval to adopt an alternative way of setting the expenditure
limit by, for example, making a permanent base adjustment based on current spending.
Approximately half of Arizona’s cities and towns have persuaded voters to approve
alternative systems. Whatever choice they make, every city and town must comply with a
uniform state reporting system and file an annual report showing its compliance with
either the state or local expenditure limit.
Constitutional provisions and
state statutes impose controls on




accounting, auditing, and fiscal
reporting.
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Property Taxes
The taxpayers’ revolt also spawned provisions added to the state constitution in the late
1970s limiting increases in property tax rates, property assessments, and overall
property tax levies. The limits apply to the primary property tax, which is used to support
general governmental operations. The secondary property tax, drawn upon for bond
issues and other specific purposes, is not subject to these limits.
Under the Arizona constitution, increases in the value of the property drawn upon to fund
local government operations are limited, generally to 10 percent each year. In addition,
the total amount of taxes drawn on such property by counties, cities, and community
college districts can grow by no more than 2 percent from one year to the next, plus an
amount concomitant with new construction. However, local governments may approve
property revenue increases in excess of these limits through override elections.18 An
additional restriction in state law limits the primary property taxes homeowners must pay
to all local jurisdictions to a combined 1 percent of the value of their residence. Still
another restriction is a “Truth-in-Taxation” law that requires local governments to roll
back primary property tax rates to reflect increases in assessed valuation and provide
public notice before voting to increase a rolled-back rate.
Restrictions on property taxes have made life a bit more difficult for local decision-
makers. The restrictions, plus the unpopularity of the local property tax, have
encouraged local governments to turn away from this source and use less restricted
revenue sources, particularly fees and sales taxes.
Mandates
When faced with budgetary problems, state officials have looked favorably upon
imposing mandates on local governments — both by passing along federal mandates
and by enacting their own. Local governments, at the end of the path of “one-way
federalism” — or what some call “shift and shaft federalism” — wind up paying many of
the costs of government. In Arizona, county officials in particular have objected to costly
mandates in the area of health care, and to the propensity of state officials to dump “the
ugly jobs” on them. In the FY 2004 budget alone, counties absorbed a $55 million hit,
picking up state responsibilities for several functions. According to the best estimates,
80 percent of the expenditures of the average county are mandated. Municipalities
enjoy a more independent status vis-a-vis the state and are not as heavily impacted by
mandates. Even when local officials sympathize with the goals of state mandates, they
are aware that all mandates distort local priorities, restrict local managerial flexibility,
and impose costs that have to be paid through local revenues.19
Arizona, like many other states, has a fiscal note process that is intended to call
attention to the costs imposed on localities by unfunded state mandates. In Arizona,
fiscal notes are prepared by the Joint Legislative Budget Committee at the request of a
member of the legislature. Local officials, however, complain that reliable cost estimates
have not been produced at all or have been done too late to influence legislative
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decision-making, and have called for a strengthening of the process. Several states, but
not Arizona, combine fiscal notes with a constitutional or statutory requirement that the
state reimburse localities, in full or in part, for the expense of undertaking the mandated
activity. As a deterrent to unfunded mandates, a requirement for reimbursement is more
effective than a simple requirement for cost estimates.20
Conclusions and Recommendations
The impact of restrictions and mandates may not be unusually severe in Arizona as
compared to California or Colorado, but they do present certain governing problems. On
the surface, governors and legislators have lost considerable control over the budget
because of formula-driven expenditures, largely for
education and health care, mandated by the voters. The
recent decline in general revenues has made finding
discretionary money in the general fund particularly
difficult. All other things being equal, the problem will
lessen as the economy improves, or if the state can
somehow tap into new general revenue sources. At the
same time, one should not discount the amount of control
or potential control lawmakers have over budgetary
matters even when the economy goes sour. By changing a
few statutes or implementing some budgetary techniques, they have access to several
funds built up from earmarked taxes and user fees. Governors and legislators have been
remarkably agile in balancing the budget without either making major spending cuts or
tax increases. Overall, though, there are areas where more general flexibility is needed,
particularly in regard to borrowing money and raising taxes. There is also a more
profound need to move toward a more comprehensive general budgeting process in
which lawmakers can more sensibly weigh the relative merits of programs and proposals
and balance spending and revenues.
Arizona elected officials have always been a bit ornery where the federal government is
concerned, and have taken complaints about the federal mandates and related matters
to Washington; they have voiced them directly or funneled them through national
organizations and the congressional delegation. Arizona governors and legislators have
also often been at odds with judges because of court rulings on mandates and other
questions. However, the legislature, if often grudgingly, has had to somehow adjust the
budget to courts’ demands for increased spending. Still, the legislature is not altogether
powerless. It can, for example, change laws dealing with class action lawsuits in tax
cases. More generally, it can minimize the possibility of lawsuits by living up to its
obligations — for example, by properly funding programs to which people are entitled by
law.
The initiative process has enjoyed increasing use in recent years. In the 1980s, groups
initiated a total of 63 statewide initiative drives. In the 1990s, this swelled to 155; 30
more were begun in 2000 and 2002.21 Less than 20 percent of these have made it to
The impact of restrictions and
mandates may not be unusually
severe in Arizona as compared to
California or Colorado, but they do
present certain governing
problems.
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the ballot and, of those, only about half were approved. Still, voters have had a
significant impact on Arizona’s financial well being through the initiative process. They
have approved the creation and extension of the state lottery, increased tobacco taxes
for health care, and expanded eligibility for health care. Voters using the initiative
process also limited the ability of state legislators to raise taxes.22 In addition, voters
have had to decide the fate of proposals placed on the ballot by the legislature. In fact,
the number of financial measures on the ballot will likely increase, as Proposition 108
encourages advocates to take their case for a tax increase to the voters.
While there may be good practical reasons to turn to the voters, what is known as “ballot
box budgeting” is something of a nightmare. It involves making major program choices
and funding policies one at a time, in a vacuum, without consideration of how they relate
to other policy alternatives, overall priorities, or their impact on revenues. Indeed,
opposing groups have both placed their cases before Arizona voters — one side asking
them to make raising taxes more difficult and the other asking them to spend more on
government programs — and the voters have given both sides what they wanted.
The Voter Protection Act requires those who are unhappy with particular voter-approved
measures to take their case back to the voters for modification or repeal. To guard
against making mistakes in the first place, some groups have called for a constitutional
change prohibiting a ballot measure from going into effect unless it is approved by the
voters in two consecutive elections. To reappraise ballot measures over time, some have
advocated that the constitution be amended to require that ballot measures be
reauthorized on a periodic basis, such as 5 or 8 years. Others — particularly those
concerned about unwise and excessive spending — have called for making the adoption
of ballot measures dependent on a two-thirds vote.
To protect against budget problems that have surfaced with some ballot measures,
particularly Proposition 204, a good idea would be to require that all initiative or
referendum measures mandating spending also identify a source of revenue for that
spending and, if the source proves to be insufficient, allow the legislature to reduce
expenditures to the amount of funding actually supplied. A measure along this line will
appear on the November 2004 ballot. In addition, to increase legislative flexibility in
raising revenues and possibly reduce the need for voter action, Proposition 108 should
be repealed, returning the requirement for the approval of tax measures in the
legislature to a majority vote. The state also could benefit by amending the constitution
when it comes to debt. That is because the limitation on general obligation bond
borrowing has not only reduced legislative flexibility but also has encouraged it to turn to
more expensive and complicated methods of borrowing money. Finally, for local
governments, there may be a need for a more effective fiscal note system and, perhaps,
one backed by a constitutional provision requiring reimbursement.
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